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I. INTRODUCTION
In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,' the Supreme Court,
through an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held with
virtual unanimity2 that
public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of
publications such as the one . . . at issue without showing in
addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact
which was made with "actual malice," i.e., with knowledge that
the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to
whether or not it was true.3
The publication at issue was a parody of a Campari Liqueur
advertisement, the gist of which portrayed Reverend Falwell
as having engaged in "a drunken incestuous rendezvous
with his mother in an outhouse,"4 and as being a habitual
drunk.5 The ad parody was accompanied by a disclaimer in-
dicating that it was " 'not to be taken seriously,' "6 and the
magazine's table of contents listed the parody as
" '[fiction.' ".7 The plaintiff Reverend Jerry Falwell's atten-
tion was drawn to the ad parody by a reporter,8 and Falwellshortly thereafter filed suit alleging libel, invasion of pri-
* Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
A.B. 1972, University of Virginia; M.A. 1974, Ph.D. 1976, J.D. 1982, Indiana
University.
I 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
2 Justice White filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he appeared
to broadly reject Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach to the case, while leaving to a
more propitious moment the task of suggesting why the first amendment required
Chief Justice Rehnquist's result. Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 883 (White, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy had not joined the Court in time for argument and took no part in
deciding the case.
3 Id. at 882.
4 Id. at 878.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. The ad parody was republished by the defendant during the course of the
litigation, which might have gone to the issue of the defendant's intent had the Court
reached this issue. See id. at 878 n. 1.
8 Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1272 (4th Cir.), reh'g denied, 805 F.2d 484 (4th
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vacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
defendants, Hustler Magazine and publisher Larry Flynt,
were granted a directed verdict on the invasion of privacy
claim and were found not liable on the libel claim, but the
jury found both defendants liable for $100,000 compensa-
tory damages and $50,000 punitive damages on the claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 9 The judgment
entered on the jury's verdict on the emotional distress claim
was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, 10 but was reversed by the
Supreme Court.
The opinion for the Court drew, at least implicitly, a
number of controversial conclusions. First, it is questiona-
ble whether Flynt's ad parody should be treated as speech
within the meaning, intent, or purposes and values of the
first amendment. That is, it is unclear whether Flynt's par-
ody is actually speech in the constitutional sense. " Second,
assuming that Flynt's parody is speech in the constitutional
sense, it is unclear why the Court gave this speech the high
level or degree of protection that it did. The Court, as will
be discussed in Section III, has frequently sought to distin-
guish between "high-value" speech, or speech close to the
core of the free speech clause, and "low-value" speech, or
speech on the periphery of, if not entirely outside the pur-
poses of, the free speech clause. This distinction is not un-
problematic, but the Court has often suggested that low-
value speech may be constitutionally subject to state regula-
tion on any one of a variety of relatively undemanding, non-
rigorous constitutional tests. It is unclear why the Court did
not view Flynt's parody as being within one of the "low-
value" speech categories or at least as being analogous to
speech ordinarily within those categories.
The Hustler Court's controvcrsial conclusions may be ex-
amined primarily by reference to the broad range of pur-
poses or values that might be thought to underlie the free
Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876
(1988).
9 Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 878. Note that the jury finding of no defamation and per-
haps the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages hardly bespeak ajury overborne
by passionate enthusiasm for the plaintiff or antipathy for the defendant.
10 Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1270.
I1 For the view that constitutional language is to be interpreted generally with
reference to the scope of its purposes rather than merely through a dictionary based,
ordinary language approach, see Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in
Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 269 & n.20 (1981).
[Vol. 19: 19
1988] FIRST AMENDMENT: HUSTLER V FALWELL 21
speech clause. This focus raises a number of other contro-
versial aspects of the Hustler opinion, including (1) the rele-
vance and application of a free speech-based concern for the
value of individual self-realization; (2) the relevance, for free
speech purposes, of the falsity and unbelievability of Flynt's
speech; and (3) the possible analogy between Flynt's speech
and invidious racial epithets. This Essay, then, considers
whether any legitimate free speech concerns raised by the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress could be
addressed by nonconstitutional restrictions on the tort or, at
least, by constitutional restrictions less dramatic than those
imposed in Hustler. If the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress is to be "constitutionalized," then the
most defensible approach is to immunize only those other-
wise tortious speech-acts addressing a matter of public in-
terest and concern, regardless of whether the plaintiff-victim
is thought to be a public figure or not.
II. SPEECH AND NON-SPEECH FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
PURPOSES
By implication, the Court in Hustler determined that
Flynt's parody was, at least as alleged, more like a written
defamation or libel than a psychological battery12 and thus
deserving of similar constitutional treatment. Intentional
infliction of emotional distress, even to the extent that it is
inflicted in some communicative manner, does not require
that the defendants have made some false assertion of fact.13
The Court nonetheless saw fit to subsume the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress within the constitu-
tional restrictions on the tort of libel. Specifically, as quoted
above, the Court required that public official or public fig-
ure plaintiffs claiming intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress show not only the elements of that tort, but also that
the defendant made a false statement of fact, and that the
defendant did so with actual malice. 14
12 For an analogy of intentional infliction of emotional distress to battery, see Col-
lin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
13 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS,
R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
14 Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 882. Presumably, the defendant's actual malice must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence, as required by the constitutional libel case
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
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The Court thus constitutionalized the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress in a peculiarly inapposite way
by grafting the extraneous modern defamation element of
falsity incongruously onto the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and anticlimactically required that the
false statement be shown to have been made with reckless
disregard for its falsity. However, there is no organic, nec-
essary, or even recurring relationship between any commu-
nicative infliction of emotional distress and the truth or
falsity of any statement of fact the defendant may happen to
make. In other words, there is no particular reason, if one is
inclined to inflict emotional distress, to do so in a way that
requires or is attended by a false statement. The emotional
distress of someone in Falwell's position is not assuaged by
the understanding that most or all readers do not believe
the literal truth of the factual assertions; the plaintiff's repu-
tation or his distress over a decrease in his reputation is not
the issue. Further, we may be sure that no one contemplat-
ing inflicting emotional distress on a public official or public
figure who is aware of the Court's rule in Hustler will be so
foolish as to expose himself to the only possibility of plain-
tiff's recovery by gratuitously including an arguably false as-
sertion of fact. There will always be ways of inflicting severe
emotional distress on public officials or public figures other
than through false factual claims. For all practical purposes,
the Court's holding in Hustler grants reasonably sophisti-
cated perpetrators essentially complete and absolute consti-
tutional protection.
The relevance in this context of false statements of fact by
the defendant will be discussed further below, but it is worth
speculating why the Court might have been led to essen-
tially graft a portion of the tort of defamation onto the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Perhaps the
Court assumed that there was no harm in doing so since the
torts of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress are often thought of as somehow mutually
equivalent t 5 or at least as on a par with each other constitu-
tionally.16 The problem is that the two kinds of tortious
15 See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1408, 1420 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (citing case authority and concluding that the plaintiff "cannot maintain a sepa-
rate cause of action for mental and emotional distress where the gravamen is
defamation").
16 Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982) (same first
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conduct might be entitled to the same degree of constitu-
tional protection without the elements of the torts, such as a
false statement, being transferable between the torts in any
non-arbitrary way. The torts of defamation and of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress plainly serve different
purposes; the falsity of an assertion of fact is generally rele-
vant, in principle, only to defamation. As one commentator
has rightly observed, "[t]he emotional distress tort ...is
designed to protect the victim's emotional well-being, as
distinct from the reputational interests historically protected
in defamation law."' 17 Intentional infliction of emotional
distress is more in the nature of a kick or a punch and need
not involve any true or false assertion of fact.
This analogy between intentional infliction of emotional
distress and the tort of battery impeaches the constitutional
logic of Hustler at its deepest level. Most of us would be re-
luctant to ever categorize any punch or kick as "speech"
within the meaning of the first amendment, or to afford such
action even a limited degree of constitutional protection.
We are reluctant to classify a punch as "speech" even
though some punches are provoked by the literal speech of
one's political opponent. Arguably, the punch may be a re-
action or a "response" to a political speech with which one
heatedly disagrees; accordingly, we appreciate that pro-
tected speech may take the form of action or symbolic
conduct. 18
But if a punch or, for that matter, a merely negligent
elbowing, does not amount to speech in the constitutional
sense, why must "written speech" be treated as speech
within the meaning of the Constitution if the "written
speech" is nothing more than a surrogate for the punch? If,
in a particular instance, "written speech" is demonstrably
amendment considerations must be applied to an outrageous conduct claim as to
defamation), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983). The Supreme judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts referred to and cited authority bearing upon this issue without deciding it
in Godbout v. Cousens, 396 Mass. 254, 485 N.E.2d 940, 947 (1985) or in Fleming v.
Benzaquin, 390 Mass. 175, 454 N.E.2d 95, 104 (1983).
17 Mead, Suing Media For Emotional Distress: A Multi-Method Analysis of Tort Law
Evolution, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 24, 27 (1983). The full implications of this point were
missed not only by ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion in Hustler, but also in Blatty v.
New York Times Co., 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 728 P.2d 1177, 232 Cal. Rptr. 542, 551 (1986)
(en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1107 (1988).
18 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
CUMBERLAND L4 W REVIEW
intended to merely have the same functions and effect as a
punch, shouldn't the law recur to substance rather than
form?19
The free speech clause has been widely interpreted by
commentators either as intended to serve a narrower20 or a
broader2l range of purposes. Interpreted broadly, the free
speech clause is thought to operate to protect the workings
of a representative process of government, to promote the
detection and dissemination of truth in the political realm,
and to accommodate and promote the important value of
individual self-realization.22 As a first approximation, a
court should be reluctant to classify "written speech" as
constitutional speech, where the utterance, apart from its
popularity or unpopularity, cannot plausibly be construed as
implicating any of the recognized purposes or functions of
the first amendment.
The Court in Hustler did not consider the relation between
the ad parody and the purposes or functions of the first
amendment presumably because it assumed that Flynt's par-
ody, however distasteful and controversial, qualified as
speech in the constitutional sense. Such an assumption
seems warranted only if one focuses on the speaker and the
addressee, both well-known, politically controversial public
figures who are natural political adversaries, in a broad
sense of the term "political." But if the focus is instead
placed on the actual speech and its context, the Court's as-
sumption seems more doubtful.
Regardless of whether one accepts the view that "Hustler
is not a bona fide competitor in the 'marketplace of
ideas,' "23 it seems clear that the contents of the magazine,
19 For a sampling of the wide range of circumstances where the Court has explic-
itly refused to exalt form over substance, see Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008, 3019
(1987); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3259-60
(1986); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 279 (1986); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985).
20 See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26-27, 79-80 (1960); BeVier, The
First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30
STAN. L. REV. 299, 300-01 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 23-25 (1971).
21 See, e.g. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.j. 877,
878-79 (1963); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 193 (1983).
22 See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 21, at 878-79.
23 Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1026 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988). But
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exclusive of any obscene material, cannot all be considered
constitutional speech. In light of the recognized purposes
of the free speech clause, one may wish to impose as a mini-
mum requirement that for something to count as speech in
the constitutional sense, it must itself embody or seek to
convey some discernible social idea, where both "social"
and "idea" are interpreted with reasonable breadth. 24 The
Court has come close to endorsing this requirement in sev-
eral cases such as the obscenity case of Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton,25 in which the Court concluded that "[w]here com-
munication of ideas, protected by the First Amendment, is
not involved .... the mere fact that, as a consequence, some
human 'utterances' or 'thoughts' may be incidentally af-
fected does not bar the State from acting to protect legiti-
mate state interests."26
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire27 established the classic "fight-
ing words ' '28 category of "written speech" and at least ar-
guably held such speech to be completely outside the
meaning of the first amendment. The Court in Chaplinsky
referred to fighting words as "no essential part of any expo-
sition of ideas .... ,"29 thereby at least suggesting a linkage
between constitutional protection and the presence of an
idea of some unspecified sort.
Requiring that constitutionally protected speech seek to
convey some rudimentary social idea is consistent with most
of the familiar rhetoric of the free speech case law. Protect-
ing written speech that embodies the requisite social idea is
perfectly consistent with protecting allegedly outrageous,
cf S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 394-95 (1975) (por-
nography characterized as antifemale propaganda).
24 See Wright, A Rationalefromj.S. Mill for the Free Speech Clause, 1985 Sup. CT. REV.
149, 156 (P. Kurland, G. Casper & D. Hutchinson eds. 1986).
25 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
26 Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 67. Discouraging the intentional infliction of
severe emotional distress would presumably count as a legitimate state interest.
27 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
28 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 837 (2d ed. 1988);
Schauer, supra note 11, at 268. For a discussion of the current unsettled status of the
"fighting words" doctrine, see 3 R. ROTUNDA,J. NOWAK &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 20.40, at 198-99 (3d ed. 1986). See also Harry Kalven, Jr.'s reference to
Chaplinsky as "a case which bespeaks the gentility of a bygone era." H. KALVEN, A
WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 78 (J. Kalven ed. 1988).
29 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. Professor Kalven pointed out that the unanimous
Court opinion in Chaplinsky, whatever its current authority, was joined by Justices
Black and Douglas, whose sensitivity to free speech values seems clear. See H.
Kalven, supra note 28, at 79.
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unpopular, or offensive ideas,30 or foolish and immoderate
speech,3 ' or the conveyance of ideas dependent upon satire,
imagination, exaggeration, or caricature,32 or speech that
does not in fact persuade33 or even attempt to persuade
some or all of one's immediate audience.
It is not at all obvious, however, that Flynt's depiction of
Jerry Falwell as engaging in drunken incest with his mother-
meets the "social idea" requirement. It is even suggested
by an argument that is useful to Hustler in a libel context
that Flynt's speech does not meet this requirement. The
material is said to be non-defamatory because it is so pa-
tently absurd and nonsensical on its face that no reasonable
reader could believe it to be true.34 While the intended and
appreciated inanity of a statement of a nominally factual sort
may save it from being defamatory, it hardly suggests that
the statement should be treated as a contribution to public
discussion or debate.
To argue that Flynt's speech would be widely thought of
as offensive, and particularly offensive to Reverend Falwell,
by itself hardly suffices to supply the requisite social idea.
While the Court majority may have seen fit to extend free
speech protection to the arguably offensive terse anti-draft
imprecation in Cohen v. California,35 and while Cohen sought
to extend protection to the emotive as well as the cognitive
aspects of the speech, 36 Cohen seems easily distinguishable.
The defendant in Cohen at least expressed, if without much
pretension to articulateness, an opinion, or reaction, to
some obviously significant political issue or debate, along
30 Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
31 Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 674 (1944); In re Stevens, 31 Cal.
3d 403, 645 P.2d 99, 183 Cal. Rptr. 48, 50 (1982) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
32 Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1408, 1415 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
33 See id. at 1421 (quoting Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 488 (4th Cir. 1986)).
34 Hustler Magazine v. Faiwell, 108 S. Ct. at 876, 879 (1988); see also Dworkin, 668
F. Supp. at 1413 (citing Frank v. National Broadcasting Co., 119 A.D.2d 252, 506
N.Y.S.2d 869, 872-73 (1986)); cf. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595
F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (recovery not permitted by a public figure where
the false statement had at least some superficial plausibility).
35 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See generally Cohen, A Look Back at Cohen v. California, 34
UCLA L. REv. 1595 (1987); Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor
Bickel, Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE L.
283.
36 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26; Heins, Banning Words: A Comment On "Words That Wound,"
18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585, 587 (1983).
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with, if not by means of, his emotive meaning. Cohen is thus
perhaps best read as protecting emotive meaning expres-
sion as long as there is some minimally sufficient grounding
in cognitive meaning. But Flynt's speech in Hustler lacks the
requisite cognitive meaning about some topic of potential
public interest, even if, as seems questionable, it was in-
tended to convey some recognizable emotive meaning.
Courts have occasionally been led to overlook this simple
logic on the dubious assumption that "all statements that
are not factual must be categorized as opinion." 37 Perhaps
the most straightforward analysis of Flynt's speech would
recognize that it did contain one assertion of fact, however
ludicrously false. But even if we assume, as the Court did in
Hustler, that no recklessly false assertion of fact is contained
within Flynt's speech,3 8 it is a fallacy to assume, as the Court
does, that Flynt's speech therefore falls into the category of"robust political debate,"3 9 or "debate about public af-
fairs," 40 or speech on "public issues."' 4 Why must speech
that is neither true nor false necessarily qualify as some sort
of opinion on a particular public issue? Presumably, an or-
dinary joke or riddle would fall into neither the fact nor
opinion category.
Of course, Flynt's speech is "about" an incontestably pub-
lic figure. This, however, does not mean necessarily that
Flynt's speech sought to convey some social idea. Even
speech by one public figure about another, antithetical pub-
lic figure need not qualify as conveying a social idea. The
Supreme Court has observed elsewhere that the mere back-
ground presence of political controversy or ideological de-
bate, "lurking" in the broader cultural context of an
instance of speech, does not itself necessarily change the
speech's category. 42
If Flynt's speech were interpreted generously, it could be
seen to indicate not merely distilled irresponsibility, or inar-
37 Dworkin, 668 F. Supp. at 1415 (citing Koch v. Goldway, 817 F.2d 507, 509 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
38 Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 882.
39 Id. at 879.
40 Id. at 880.
41 Id.
42 See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973) (gender-labeled help wanted ads as merely commercial speech,
rather than political speech, even though the notion of the propriety of gender-stere-
otyped job categories is plainly implicated).
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ticulate animosity, but a more particular message, perhaps
along the lines of a hyperbolically formulated accusation of
broad, unprincipled hypocrisy on the part of Reverend
Falwell. If Flynt's language were reasonably susceptible of
such a meaning, it would certainly meet the minimum re-
quirements for speech in the constitutional sense. But
Flynt's speech cannot genuinely sustain any such meaning.
Initially, Flynt's speech appears to be speech in the constitu-
tional sense, in that it expressly, or by reasonable inference,
accuses or associates Falwell with drunken incest contrary to
Falwell's pretensions. Flynt, however, wants to assert, for
free speech purposes, that this sort of implication, was not
meant seriously43 and could not be taken seriously by a rea-
sonable audience, 4 4 which seems plausible if "reasonable" is
defined restrictively. There is certainly no obvious reason
why Flynt should be allowed inconsistent positions on this
issue. However, if the "unprincipled hypocrisy" claim is not
fairly attributable to Flynt's speech, no other cognizable so-
cial idea remains, except that which unusually creative per-
sons, or Flynt's attorneys, may gratuitously bestow upon the
speech after the fact.
Finally, one can easily envision deriving a great deal of
personal gratification, if not individual self-fulfillment, from
the speech in question, and individual self-fulfillment is
often considered among the primary values underlying the
free speech clause. 45 The problem with this view, even if we
assume that Flynt's speech promoted his self-fulfillment as
much as it might have impaired that of Falwell, is that not
everything that promotes a value underlying the free speech
clause is necessarily speech in the constitutional sense.46
Even if Flynt's ad parody promoted Flynt's self-fulfillment in
43 Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 878. The true inanity of Flynt's language is recognized in
Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 424 (1988) (Flynt's speech as "a bad, dirty joke"), but Professor
Smolla then reinvests Flynt's speech with coherent cognitive meaning in id. at 425
(message of Falwell's alleged hypocrisy and Flynt's associated distaste for Falwell).
44 See id. Presumably, the jury took into consideration the possibility that there
may be a difference in sophistication between the readership of Hustler and, say, that
of The Review of Metaphysics.
45 See sources cited supra at note 21; see also Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Free-
dom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 591 (1982). But cf. BeVier, supra note 20, at 322 (judgments as to what pro-
motes self-realization perhaps best left to elected legislators rather than judges).
46 But cf Heins, supra note 36, at 590 (gutter racial invective "not wholly unre-
lated" to self-fulfillment value).
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some relevant sense recognizable to Aristotle,4 7 or Rous-
seau, 48 or John Stuart Mill, 49 which seems doubtful in the
extreme, one might presumably derive comparable self-ful-
fillment from a vigorous session of chopping firewood or
from leading a scout troop on a hike. These latter are
hardly speech in the constitutional sense, and Flynt's ad par-
ody is only a marginally closer case.
To put the point in perspective, one might note that
Flynt's putative speech simply does not lend itself to classic
free speech policy analysis. What would be the point, for
example, of suggesting that Falwell's situation, or the wel-
fare of the public generally, would be promoted by"counterspeech" or a rebuttal by Falwell of whatever asser-
tions or opinions are thought to be conveyed by Flynt's
speech? 50 Certainly, the public interest might be served by
Falwell's reacting to Flynt's speech in a way that delegi-
timizes Flynt's approach, but this is hardly the same as "an-
swering" Flynt's speech on its own terms. Similarly, it
would be impertinent to suggest that to avoid or minimize
the injury, Falwell should have avoided "further bombard-
ment" by averting his gaze from the ad parody. 5' Further-
more, it would be genuinely odd to ask, for example, such
questions as whether Flynt had available, at reasonable cost,
sufficient alternative channels or means of conveying his"message" in undistorted fashion beyond the means he ac-
47 See generally Aristotle's ETHICS and POLITICS.
48 See generally Rousseau's DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGINS OF INEQUALITY.
49 See generally Mill's ON LIBERTY. Among contemporary writers, Professor David
Richards interestingly suggests that the background right underlying freedom of
speech is a fundamental "right to conscience," or a right to "interpretive indepen-
dence of our twin moral powers of rationality and reasonableness." See D. RICHARDS,
TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 166 (1986). Again, Flynt's parody only mini-
mally, if at all, implicates this basic value even assuming that the speech did not tend
as much to sabotage the moral independence of the target as exalt that of the
speaker.
50 For the importance in other contexts of counterspeech, see Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); see also Dworkin v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1408, 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
51 Cf Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words Intended to Inflict Severe
Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1749-50 (1985) (noting the possibility of a
defendant's making it impossible for a public figure to avert her attention). But cf.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) ("[t]hose in the Los Angeles courthouse
could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting
their eyes") (establishing, in parallel with a few cases involving dangerous canines, a
"one bite" rule).
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tually chose.52 If Flynt had some cognizable social message
to impart, he would, of course, have the resources and noto-
riety to convey his message in ways not involving the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. 53 If, on the other
hand, Flynt intended neither to convey a social idea, nor to
arbitrarily joke about a controversial public figure he dis-
liked, but rather intended to inflict emotional distress on a
designated victim, obviously no alternative means less sub-
ject to governmental regulation were available to him.
III. Low-VALUE SPEECH VERSUS HIGH-VALUE SPEECH FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSES
A cold-eyed analysis suggests that Flynt's ad parody prob-
ably does not bear classification as speech within the mean-
ing of the first amendment. But even if Flynt's parody
comes within the scope of the first amendment, if it can be
classified, apart from its controversiality or unpopularity, as
"low-value" and not "high-value" speech, it should be sub-
ject to state regulation on grounds less stringent than those
adopted by the Court in Hustler.54
The low- versus high-value speech distinction, perhaps
traceable to Chaplinsky,55 assumes that in light of first
amendment values, different types or categories of speech
deserve different degrees of protection.56 Speech central to,
or at the core of,57 the first amendment merits stringent pro-
tection, while speech less central, or at the periphery of the
first amendment, merits less protection.58 The low- versus
52 For the relevance of the availability of "ample alternative channels of communi-
cation" in the context of time, place, and manner restrictions on the use of public
forum, see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(citing authority).
53 But cf Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25-26 (concluding that Cohen's "otherwise inex-
pressible emotions" could not be conveyed in a way that did not fall afoul of the
criminal statute under which Cohen was charged). For a sense of the complexities of
the "ample alternative channels" analysis, see Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the
First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 43-45 (1975).
54 See Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 882.
55 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (referring to certain categories of speech as being of
only "slight social value as a step to truth").
56 For a recent academic exposition, see Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 46, 47 & nn.2 & 4 (1987).
57 For a recent reference to the concept of the "core" of the first amendment, see
Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1162 (1988) (the category of classic "political speech"
as at the core).
58 For a recent example, see Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1297-98 (7th
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high-value determination does not reflect some essentially
controversial judicial assessment of the merits of the idea
being expressed, but rather "the extent to which the speech
furthers the historical, political, and philosophical purposes
that underlie the first amendment." 9 At least some degree
of judicial consensus has developed around this inquiry.60
Cir. 1988) (regulation of the category of "commercial speech" based on its content
as "less problematic" than regulation of political speech based on its content).
59 Stone, supra note 21, at 194.
60 See id. at 194-95. Professor Stone indicates that among the low-value free
speech categories are "express incitement, false statements of fact, obscenity, com-
mercial speech, fighting words, and child pornography." Id. In this context, "ob-
scenity" presumably refers generally to sexually explicit or pornographic materials;"obscenity" is often used to refer to the legal characterization of materials as failing
to meet the relevant constitutional test, and therefore not at all protected. See, e.g.,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("[t]his much has been categorically set-
tled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment")
(citing authority). Characterizing express incitement as low-value speech also does
not seem inevitable. At least some speech expressly inciting illegal acts would seem
most logically classified as core political speech, crisply articulating an important ap-
proach to important public affairs, and therefore high-value speech. It is just that at
least some such speech may fail the appropriate constitutional test, one that is very
demanding on the government, as befits high-value speech. See Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (clear and present danger formulation articu-
lated); see also American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 (7th Cir.
1985) (pornography cannot be considered low-value speech if it is sought to be sup-
pressed because of its alleged influence on political and social attitudes), aff'd per
curiam, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). But see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 544-45
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (express incitement of overthrow of the govern-
ment as low-value speech).
Whether one chooses to call the language of express incitement high- or low-value
speech depends upon whether one focuses on its crucial political content and view-
point, or upon its counseling of seriously harmful illegal acts. This choice itself is
presumably not crucial, as long as the burden on the government to justify sup-
pressing the speech is a heavy one, as with incontestably core speech. One reason,
though, for not classifying both obscene materials and express incitement to rebel-
lion as low-value speech is that it makes the low-value speech classification nearly
useless as an independent predictor of the degree of protection against government
suppression that the speech is entitled to. On such an analysis, we know from the
low-value speech classification only that the speech is entitled to either no, or virtu-
ally no, free speech protection (obscene materials), or the most stringent sort of pro-
tection, no less protective than any kind of high-value speech (express incitement), or
else requires protection of an intermediate degree (e.g., commercial speech). The
low- versus high-value distinction thus loses much of its meaning. The same point
might be made, incidentally, with respect to the distinction between content-based
and content-neutral restrictions on speech, in which knowing that a government re-
striction on speech is content-based tells us very little, if anything, about the strin-
gency or laxity of the government's constitutional burden in suppressing the speech.
See, e.g., Curtis, 840 F.2d at 1298 (content-based regulation of commercial speech
"less problematic" than regulation of public affairs speech); Schauer, supra note 11,
at 279 ("[llaws against price fixing, extortion, perjury and solicitation to... nonpolit-
ical crimes are all 'aimed at communicative impact,' yet these.., laws are intuitively
and correctly held to be outside the coverage of the first amendment"). For general
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Perhaps the most useful analysis of what makes particular
kinds of speech low-value speech for constitutional pur-
poses is that of Professor Sunstein,61 who suggests the
relevance of four factors. These four factors are as follows:
first, that the speech be remote from the central first amend-
ment focus on popular control of public affairs or the gov-
ernmental process; 62 second, that the speech be largely
noncognitive rather than cognitive, or knowledge-im-
parting, in nature; 63 third, that the speaker not be intending
to convey a message;64 and finally, that the speech fall into a
class where it is relatively unlikely that the government's
motive in seeking to regulate the speech is constitutionally
impermissible.65
While these four factors are not susceptible of invariably
uncontroversial application, they do collectively suggest, in
as unequivocal a way as can reasonably be hoped for, that
Flynt's speech in the Hustler case qualifies at best as low-
value speech. First, although Falwell and Flynt are both
public figures who frequently publish ideas about public af-
fairs and public policy, Flynt's speech in the Hustler case
does not reasonably seek to convey any of these governmen-
tal process-related ideas. Second, Flynt's speech is either
wildly false or utterly devoid of cognitive or knowledge-im-
parting content. Third, any coherent message is "brought
to" Flynt's speech by the creative reader, rather than rea-
sonably drawn from it. Finally, the theory that an illegiti-
mate government motive played any significant role in
regulating the defendant's speech is implausible. The regu-
lation was, after all, initiated by a private party plaintiff in a
civil suit whose claims must often filter their way through
the jury process. Equally as important, the government's
own role in regulating the kind of speech at issue in Hustler
simply reflects the widespread view that there should be at
least some minimal form of civil tort redress for the inten-
tional infliction of severe emotional distress.66
discussions of the content-based versus content-neutral speech restriction distinc-
tion, see the authorities cited supra at notes 56 & 59 and Redish, The Content Distinction
in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981).
61 See Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 602-06.
62 Id. at 603.
63 Id. at 606, 603 n.87.
64 Id. at 603-04.
65 Id. at 604.
66 Consider the evolution of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
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Consideration of Professor Sunstein's four factors thus
suggests that Flynt's speech should at best be classified as
low-value speech and should not be given the practically ab-
solute67 constitutional protection conferred on it by the
Court. Flynt's parody is certainly entitled to no greater pro-
tection than arguably offensive speech that constitutes an in-
dependent common law tort. In the past, the Court has
permitted state regulation of non-obscene but arguably of-
fensive sexually oriented speech, based on its content, with-
out imposing a demanding constitutional test. State
regulation is allowed on the assumption that such speech is
low-value speech 68 on the periphery of first amendment
concerns. 69 In sexually oriented speech cases, the Court has
recognized that it would be idle pedantry to suggest that
regulating profanity in appropriate contexts imposes some
appreciable burden or disadvantage on speakers who wish
to convey a particular viewpoint,70 or even on those who
wish to convey a particular speech "content." 71 As Justice
Stevens has observed, "[a] requirement that indecent lan-
guage be avoided will have its primary effect on the form,
rather than the content, of serious communication. There
are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use
of less offensive language." 72
Some conceptions of what constitutes "core" or high-
value speech are more expansive. One commentator has
suggested, for example, that "[e]xpressions of dislike or dis-
respect for another are precisely the type of ideological
communications that are within the very core of the protec-
tion accorded by the first amendment. " 73 Doubtless some
from such a landmark case as Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814
(1926), as traced in Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Mead, supra note 17; Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental
Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939).
67 See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
68 See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality
opinion).
69 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.).
The Court more recently took a similar approach in analyzing a school district's regu-
lation of offensive or vulgar speech by a public high school student in Bethel School
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3166 (1986).
70 See Stone, supra note 21, at 243-44.
71 See id. at 243; Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 743 & n.18.
72 Pacifica Found, 438 U.S. at 743 n.18. But cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971) ("words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force").
Of course, no one supposes that form and content are utterly separate and unrelated.
73 Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U.L.Q 531, 569 (1980); see also
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expressions of dislike or disrespect may qualify as high-
value speech, depending, among other considerations, on
the content of the speech. But some instances of speech
conveying disrespect, as we may assume Flynt's does of
Falwell, are so "open" and undifferentiated-essentially all
that Flynt "says" of Falwell is immediately "retracted" by
Flynt's disclaimer 74-that the values underlying the free
speech clause are at best not strongly implicated. This con-
clusion is independent of one's sympathy, or lack thereof,
for Flynt or Falwell or the ideas ordinarily associated with
either. Regardless of the identity or popularity of the
speaker or the target, "few of us would march our sons and
daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right" 75 to
commit the common law tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress by means of words or drawings that are,
by admission, as devoid of any seriously intended meaning
or public issue content as Flynt's were. 76 From the stand-
point of the public interest, it seems appropriate to require,
in exchange for granting immunity from liability for the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress on a public fig-
ure or public official, that the speaker at least take the
trouble to attempt to reasonably convey some particular
public interest-related idea.
The Court thus had ample reason to classify Flynt's
speech as low-value speech, at best, and accord it less than
the practically absolute protection that it did. In addition,
despite the important difference between the two torts,
many of the individual and social costs of false and defama-
tory speech about public figures and public officials that
have been identified in the libel context 77 are also relevant
in the context of the Hustler case. If the risk of defamation,
or unprovable defamation, constitutes a disincentive to pub-
lic service,78 so does the risk of speech like Flynt's that is
Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1137,
1149 (1983) (impossibility of separating "moral sensibilities" from "political
sensibilities").
74 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 879 (1988).
75 Cf Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (referring to the right to see sexually explicit non-obscene materials at a
convenient local theater).
76 Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 878.
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now essentially immunized by the Supreme Court.
The arguments presented above do not rely in the slight-
est on any putative social interest in maintaining or elevat-
ing the level of public discourse or in promoting public
civility. While such an interest has been given central im-
portance by such champions of liberty as John Stuart Mill, 79
there seems to be little current enthusiasm for such an ap-
parently anachronistic approach.8 0 This state of affairs may
eventually change if the judiciary begins to conclude that
the quality of public debate, particularly at the lower ranges,
is tending to systematically deteriorate over time.81
It has been said that "[o]nly small men are afraid of small
writings."82 Writers of the stature of Warren and Bran-
deis, 83 however, have expressed reasonable fear of material
less inanely virulent than Flynt's. Referring to personal gos-
sip in general, Warren and Brandeis classically warned that
Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persist-
ently circulated, is potent for evil. It both belittles and per-
verts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of
things, thus dwarfing.the thoughts and aspirations of a peo-
ple .... Easy of comprehension, appealing to that weak side
of human nature which is never wholly cast down by the mis-
fortunes and frailties of our neighbors, no one can be sur-
prised that it usurps the place of interest in brains capable of
other things. 84
If there is a public interest in diminishing the scope and per-
vasiveness of mere idle gossip, there is an even more sub-
stantial public interest in providing only limited
constitutional protection for intentional infliction of severe
emotional distress.
Finally, it is possible to argue for relatively great constitu-
tional protection for otherwise tortious intentional infliction
79 See the discussion of Mill's view in Wright, supra note 24, at 158-6 1.
80 One commentator has stated flatly that "[t]he societal interest in purifying or
raising the level of discourse is not a sufficient justification for regulating speech.
The abstract interest in civility is too weak to justify such explicit content regulation."
Note, supra note 51, at 1762 n.71 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971)).
81 See generally Wright, Judicial Responses to Long-Term Societal Decline, 30 ARiz. L.
REV. 271 (1988).
82 Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341, 1360 n.58 (N.D. Tex.
1985) (quoting Pierre de Beaumarchais), aff'd, 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1295 (1987).
83 See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
84 Id. at 196; see also A. BICKEL, THE MORALIv OF CoNsErNr 61-75 (1975).
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of emotional distress on the grounds that such conduct
amounts merely to "blowing off steam," thereby avoiding
the risk of more serious harm by the defendant.85 Even if we
assume, however, that this essentially Aristotelian theory of
catharsis is psychologically sound and that the harms of such
speech are slight, this argument should give us pause. If the
courts provide more than quite modest constitutional pro-
tection in accordance with this theory, the courts are essen-
tially paying off to an implicit threat by defendants, many of
whom, including Flynt, are acting with deliberation rather
than impulse, to wreak even more serious havoc on their
targets, or on others, if their otherwise tortious conduct is
not strongly immunized. Adopting the "blowing off steam"
rationale is, therefore, even more objectionable than ac-
cording a "heckler's veto" to those who point to their own
potentially violent reaction in order to justify suppressing
disfavored speech. 86 Ultimately, the only sensible judicial
response to those who feel some irresistible impulse to blow
off steam is to insist that they do so by means of relatively
high-value speech, of which defendants such as Flynt are
presumably readily capable, or else accept a more modest
level of free speech protection.87
One controversial area of the law in which the claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress is sought to be
countered in part by a "blowing off steam" rationale is that
of abusive, racially charged epithets or invective.88 Any at-
tempt to sort out instances of personally directed racial in-
vective deserving greater and lesser degrees of protection is
apt to be difficult.8 9 At least as to public official or public
figure plaintiffs, the logic of the Court in Hustler will be
clear: the defendant's speech will be immunized as long as
the defendant is not so unwary as to gratuitously include a
false, but plausible, statement of fact about the plaintiff.
85 See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 13, § 12, at 59; Magruder, supra note 66, at
1053; Prosser, supra note 66, at 887 ("[Slome safety valve must be left through which
irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.").
86 See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1948).
87 It is worth noting that while the Restatement subjects the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress to constitutional limitations-as all torts, presumably,
should be-it does not begin to address the question of the level or degree of free
speech protection that is appropriate. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566
comment f (1977).
88 See Heins, supra note 36, at 590.
89 See Note, supra note 51, at 1775.
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This rule, however, is less than fully satisfactory, espe-
cially when it is recognized that the category of "public offi-
cials" is often defined expansively, so to include, for
example, ordinary police officers.90 One can certainly imag-
ine that continually repeated vicious racial invective directed
at a black police officer by a superior officer in the police
hierarchy could be sufficient to establish the common law
elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 9'
Rather than simply regretting the large social cost of such
speech, borne disproportionately by ethnic minorities, one
might consider whether a reduced level of constitutional
protection could ever be appropriate in such cases.
In accordance with the basic distinction drawn in this Es-
say, courts should assume the quite manageable task of con-
sidering whether the speech at issue is "pure" racial
invective, articulating either no particular social idea or no
social idea not reasonably conveyable without resort to ra-
cial epithets, or is instead speech that does convey such an
idea. Not all racial invective is constitutionally alike. Our
free speech traditions will often require protection, for ex-
ample, for the misguided eugenics policy advocate. They do
not require substantial protection for the speaker whose"point" or message involves no more than simply announc-
ing that the particular listener-victim is indeed quite uncon-
troversially a member of some racial or ethnic group to
which the speaker attaches, for utterly unspecified reasons, a
pejorative appellation. That a person A, who is a member of
group B, is referred to by the speaker as a (member of
group) BI, without more, where B, is merely a rude name for
B, is not itself a sufficient social idea, however much it may"resonate" or fit in with a broader cultural element of an
actually articulated racial ideology.
This distinction would often protect speech that, for ex-
ample, attempts to give a reason for the view that members
of group B are somehow objectionable or even speech that
90 See Fleming v. Benzaquin, 390 Mass. 175, 454 N.E.2d 95, 104-05 (1983) (con-
cluding in dicta, that the weight of authority so holds) (citing Note, Police Defamation
Suits Against Citizens Complaining of Police Misconduct, 22 ST. Louis U.LJ. 676, 684-85
(1978)).
91 See the private employee case of Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 932-34
(N.D. I11. 1984) (distinction between actionable emotional distress and the unpleas-
antness of mere insults, annoyances, or indignities) (discussing no free speech
issues).
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asserts that some or all Bs possess some objectionable qual-
ity. Under this distinction, such speech would be protected
even if the speech is addressed only to one of the members
of B whom the speaker has no realistic hope of persuading.92
One might object that this approach protects the articulate
or the reason-giving racist. The objection is correct, but it is
a result that seems consistent with free speech values and
purposes. And at least for the moment, the alternative ac-
cepted by the majority of the Court, in the case of public
officials and public figures, is more solicitous of even the
most painful, inane racial invective as long as the speaker
does not inadvertently make a false, but plausible, factual
claim. 93
IV. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE TORT BY
NON-CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS
It would be perfectly sensible to have misgivings about re-
ducing, if not eliminating, constitutional protection for
Flynt's speech if the courts would, as a result, be left with
insufficient means of controlling potential jury excesses in
cases not involving the expression of any social idea. But
this is not the case. The courts have at their disposal a
number of nonconstitutional means of reducing the poten-
tial for abuse of the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.
The essential legitimacy of the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress is well established, 94 and Profes-
sor Prosser suggested in his seminal article in 1939 that up
until that time, the tort had been well policed and generally
not used as an instrument of abuse.95 Recently, though, the
fear has arisen that plaintiffs might use the tort of inten-
92 But see Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action For Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 177 (1982). Otherwise protected
speech directed only to implacably opposed listeners, or that is not even intended to
convince that particular audience, should not for that reason alone lose its protected
character. The value of free speech is not solely dependent upon the prospect of
changing minds; one might seek instead to preserve one's integrity by taking a defini-
tive stand on some controversial public issue, even to an unalterably hostile audi-
ence, perhaps partly out of a desire to avoid hypocrisy or patronizing one's audience.
93 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882-83 (1988). For a brief dis-
cussion of some of these issues, see L. TRIBE, supra note 28, § 12-8, at 838 n. 17.
94 See Yeager v. Local Union 20, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 453
N.E.2d 666, 670 (1983) (unanimity of adoption among the states).
95 Prosser, supra note 66, at 888-89.
[Vol. 19:19
FIRST AMENDMENT: HUSTLER V FALWELL
tional infliction of emotional distress to avoid short statutes
of limitation, circumvent restrictions on punitive damage
awards, unduly expand privacy concepts, or generally ap-
peal to juror prejudice, among other potential abuses. 96
Each of these potential problems, however, can readily be
controlled by insistence on appropriate common law restric-
tions. One commentator has observed, for example, that"the strict requirements of the outrageousness standard" 97
may account for the paucity of successful emotional distress
suits against media defendants. 98 The common law require-
ment that the plaintiff show severe emotional harm99 and
that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous,
over and above showing the defendant's intent, functions as
an effective nonconstitutional limitation on the range of the
tort. 10 0
Accordingly, a showing of defendant's intent does not
substitute for a showing of outrageousness, and a showing
of outrageousness does not substitute for showing the req-
uisite intent.101 Similarly, neither intent nor outrageousness
substitutes for a showing, perhaps even on a standard of"convincing" evidence,102 of the seriousness or gravity of
the emotional harm inflicted.103 If, despite the possibility of
96 See Mead, supra note 17, at 25.
97 Id. at 53.
98 Id.
99 See Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1021 (1st Cir. 1988).
100 See, e.g., Ross v. Bums, 612 F.2d 271, 273 (6th Cir. 1980) (absence of "extreme
and outrageous" conduct found as a matter of law); Cape Publications v. Bridges,
423 So. 2d 426, 428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. -1982) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893
(1983). But see Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1164 (1988), in which the Court reiter-
ated its view, adopted in Hustler, that an outrageousness standard would be too "in-
herently subjective." It might be noted, however, that the Court continues to
criminalize speech alleged to be obscene based on the no less inherently subjective
standard of lack of "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918, 1921 (1987)
(citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
101 See, e.g., Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1275 (3d
Cir. 1979) (en banc); Godbout v. Cousens, 396 Mass. 254, 485 N.E.2d 940, 946
(1985) (not requiring a showing that the defendant's intention was to cause particu-
larly severe emotional distress).
102 See Prosser, supra note 66, at 888.
103 See id.; see also Mead, supra note 17, at 48 ("[t]hough peace of mind is protected
by the principles underlying both invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional dis-
tress torts, it appears the disturbance to such mental tranquility must be far greater
to support the latter action."). But cf Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W.
814, 816 (1926) (no explicit requirement that the level of emotional distress actually
suffered be severe).
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judicial supervision of the elements, further restrictions on
the tort are necessary, the courts could simply limit or bar
the availability of punitive damages. This limitation could
perhaps be based on the theory that the legal distinction be-
tween merely being liable for this tort, and appropriately be-
ing subject to punitive damages, is essentially arbitrary. 0 4
As has been suggested in the libel area, the states might sim-
ply impose a reasonable statutory maximum on the amount
of total damages recoverable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.1o5 Finally, the tort can have a short stat-
ute of limitations no longer than the period applicable to
the most closely related torts.' 0 6
V. CONCLUSION
The threat to the broadest plausible range of free speech
values posed by the potential for tort liability of speech akin
to Flynt's is quite minimal, especially if the courts and legis-
lators adopt the available nonconstitutional means of re-
stricting potential excesses. The Court in Hustler, of course,
chose instead to protect almost absolutely, in a practical
sense, language intended merely to inflict severe emotional
distress on public figures and public officials.
One reason for this approach, beyond our cultural enthu-
siasm for any extension at all of the first amendment, may be
the Court's prediction that such a course would help avoid
subjecting the Court to superintending yet another stream
of free speech cases. The problem is that it is probably not
much easier to judicially identify public officials and public
figures for such purposes than it is to tell whether particular
language seeks to convey a cognizable social idea. For ex-
ample, suppose a television reporter emotionally abused
Jessica McClure, the toddler famous for falling into a well.
Would the case really hinge on the presence or absence of a
plausible false statement of fact, or would the court instead
find a way to deny her public figure status? 0 7 This example
suggests that public figure versus private figure status is
104 See the discussion in Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1277.
105 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 77, at 815.
106 Cf Yeager v. Local Union 20, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 453
N.E.2d 666, 672 (1983) (intentional infliction of emotional distress as falling into the
residual category of a four year limitations period in Ohio).
107 For one possible approach to judicially resolving the most difficult borderline
cases of the related issue of what counts as speech that is on a matter of public inter-
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only loosely associated with the essential concerns underly-
ing the free speech clause, which are captured more accu-
rately by a concern for the presence of the requisite social
idea.
It is initially surprising, though, in view of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's heavy reliance on libel precedents, 108 that no
member of the Court chose to pursue the possibility of im-
posing different constitutional standards based upon
whether the speech at issue was on a matter of public inter-
est and concern or on a matter of private or personal inter-
est and concern. This approach is suggested by recent cases
in libel 0 9 and other" 0 areas. On reflection, though, the
Court's disinclination to pursue this avenue may be ex-
plained on the basis of the poor fit between these categories
and the actual speech in Hustler. It is probably safe to say
that Flynt's speech itself was not on some matter of public
interest or concern. But it also fits uneasily within the cate-
gory of merely private or personal interest speech. It is not
as though Flynt had stopped to inform Falwell that he had
dropped his car keys or was merely expressing annoyance
over Falwell's reassigning him to a less prestigious job.
Finding it difficult to categorize Flynt's speech as either pub-
lic or private, the Court might have seen no point in apply-
ing the distinction." ' l
The problem with this logic, however, is that the Court
has implicitly adopted the wrong "default" setting. Even if
the Court could not classify Flynt's speech as either public
or non-public interest speech, it should not have effectively
classified it as public interest speech by strongly constitu-
tionalizing it. The Court should constitutionalize only such
speech for which it has a clear affirmative reason, in light of
basic free speech values, to protect. Speech that is not pub-
lic interest speech, all else equal, should not be strongly
est, see Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DE PAUL L. REV. 27
(1988).
108 Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 878-82.
109 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985)
(plurality opinion).
110 See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2896-97 (1987) (public em-
ployee dismissal case allegedly based on the employee's speech); Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (same).
II I At least one commentator has found the distinction between speech on mat-
ters of public concern and speech not on such matters to be unsatisfactory, for rea-
sons addressed in Section II above. See Note, supra note 51, at 1773-74.
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constitutionalized because the "default" position, for un-
classifiable speech, should be for the federal courts to re-
spect the interest balancing inherent in state common law
adjudication of tort claims.
